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ARRIVING AT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED: THE TASER
PROBLEM AND REFORMING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
ANALYSIS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Kate Seabright
Abstract: Federal law allows private citizens to bring civil suits against government
officials who violate their constitutional rights while acting under the color of state law. The
doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from liability when their conduct does not
violate clearly established constitutional rights. When determining whether a right was
clearly established at the time of a particular injury, the Ninth Circuit purportedly looks to
whatever decisional law is available to inform its analysis. This Comment examines recent
Taser-related cases to show that, in practice, courts in the Ninth Circuit actually take two
divergent approaches. Some look only to binding, factually similar precedent, while others
are willing to look outside of a case’s factual context and rely on both published and
unpublished cases from across the country. This inconsistency creates three major problems:
inconsistent outcomes for litigants, confusion for district courts and government officials,
and a propensity for defining clearly established law at an impermissibly high level of
generality. This Comment argues that adopting the three-part framework articulated by the
Eleventh Circuit would mitigate each of these issues and bring much needed clarity to the
law of qualified immunity in the Ninth Circuit.

INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Jayzel Mattos was tased by a Maui police officer who was
responding to a domestic violence call at the Mattos home. 1 Ms. Mattos
happened to be standing between her husband and the officer when the
officer announced that her husband was under arrest. 2 She did not
immediately move out of the way, and as the officer moved toward her,
she held out her arm to prevent his body from pressing against her
chest. 3 Ms. Mattos was attempting to defuse the situation by asking
everyone to calm down and go outside so that her sleeping children
would not be disturbed when, without warning, the officer shot his Taser
at her. 4
Two years later, a Snohomish County police officer tased Donald
Gravelet-Blondin outside of his home. 5 The officer was responding to a
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 439 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013).

491

15 - Seabright Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 11:02 AM

492

[Vol. 89:491

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

911 call placed by the family of Mr. Blondin’s neighbor, who was
attempting to commit suicide.6 As officers wrestled with the suicidal
man, Mr. Blondin emerged from his house to ask them what they were
doing to his neighbor. 7 The officers ordered him to stop and move back,
and when Mr. Blondin did not immediately comply, one of the officers
tased him. 8
Both Ms. Mattos and Mr. Blondin sued the officers who tased them
for using excessive force. 9 However, only Mr. Blondin was allowed to
proceed with his case: the Ninth Circuit granted qualified immunity to
the officer in Mattos v. Agarano 10 but denied immunity to the officer in
Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton. 11 Qualified immunity protects government
agents from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not
violate clearly established constitutional rights. 12 Whether a right was
clearly established at the time of a particular injury depends on the
precedent available at the time of the injury: the Supreme Court has held
that existing precedent “must have placed the . . . constitutional question
beyond debate.” 13
Problematically, the Supreme Court has declined to provide lower
courts with guidance as to which sources of law may inform a court’s
clearly established analysis. 14 The Mattos court relied only on binding,
Taser-related precedent to inform its analysis. 15 Finding no pre-2006
Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit case addressing the use of a Taser in a
factually similar situation, the court concluded that Ms. Mattos’ rights
were not clearly established at the time of her injury and that the officer
was therefore entitled to qualified immunity from Ms. Mattos’ suit. 16 In
contrast, the Gravelet-Blondin court found that Mr. Blondin’s right to be
free from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment was clearly
established as of 2008, even though no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit
6. Id. at 1089.
7. Id. at 1089–90.
8. Id. at 1090.
9. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 439; Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1090.
10. 661 F.3d at 452.
11. 728 F.3d at 1096.
12. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
13. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
14. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32; John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 1295, 1309 (2012) (“[I]t is important to enumerate the sources of law that may establish [a]
right. However, the Supreme Court did not perform this task in Harlow, and it has not done so in the
intervening thirty years.”).
15. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 452.
16. Id.
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case dealing with Tasers and excessive force had been decided between
Ms. Mattos’ injury in 2006 and Mr. Blondin’s injury two years later. 17
If no additional precedent were available by the time of Mr. Blondin’s
injury, what explains the difference in outcomes in these two cases? This
Comment suggests that the divergent approaches to the clearly
established analysis taken by different Ninth Circuit courts are to blame.
When deciding whether to grant immunity to the officer in Mattos, the
Ninth Circuit panel looked only to binding, Taser-related precedent.18
When faced with the same inquiry, the Gravelet-Blondin panel looked to
non-Taser cases, cases from other circuits, and unpublished district court
orders. 19 By looking to a larger body of case law, the Gravelet-Blondin
court was able to find the precedent it needed to hold that Mr. Blondin’s
right was clearly established at the time of the injury. Crucially, the
Mattos court could have come to the same conclusion had it also looked
to the broader scope used by the Gravelet-Blondin court. 20 This example
illustrates the need to harmonize the Ninth Circuit’s standard regarding
what constitutes clearly established law in the qualified immunity
context.
This Comment uses the Taser cases discussed above to illuminate the
inconsistency in what constitutes clearly established law in the Ninth
Circuit. Part I explores the purpose of the qualified immunity doctrine
and lays out the test for determining when the doctrine protects officials
accused of constitutional violations. Part II summarizes Ninth Circuit
precedent to date on qualified immunity in the Taser context and uses
these cases to note an inconsistency in how Ninth Circuit panels have
approached the issue of clearly established rights. Part III explains the
three main problems this variance causes: inconsistent outcomes for
litigants, confusion for district courts and law enforcement, and a
tendency to define clearly established law at an impermissibly high level
of generality. Finally, Part IV argues that the Ninth Circuit should adopt
the three-part framework created by the Eleventh Circuit for the clearly
established analysis. It again looks to the Taser cases to show how the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach differs from those applied by the Ninth
Circuit, and argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach would help
address the issues identified in Part III. Lastly, this Comment
recommends that the Ninth Circuit take an appropriate case en banc to

17.
18.
19.
20.

Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1105 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
Mattos, 661 F.3d at 452.
Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1092–96.
See infra Part III.A.
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change its clearly established standard.
I.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY PROTECTS GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS FROM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT THAT
DOES NOT VIOLATE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A.

Qualified Immunity Aims to Balance Citizens’ Rights with Officers’
Need to Perform Their Duties Reasonably

Federal law gives citizens the right to bring a private cause of action
against public officials who violate constitutional rights while acting
under the color of state law. 21 When faced with these suits officials often
claim the protection of qualified immunity, 22 which protects government
agents from civil liability when their conduct does not violate clearly
established constitutional rights. 23 Federal courts have embraced
qualified immunity in recognition that a government actor should not be
held liable if he or she acted in good faith. 24 The doctrine is considered
necessary to permit government actors to “exercise their discretion
boldly”: 25 if government officials were liable every time their actions
violated the law, they would hesitate to take action that might be “close
to the line” of legality. 26 Critically, the doctrine shields government
officials even if they acted based on a mistaken understanding of law or
fact. 27 Consequently, an official can use the doctrine to avoid liability
even if his or her conduct violated the claimant’s constitutional rights. 28
In sum, courts are charged with balancing the competing interests of
holding public officials accountable when they exercise their power
irresponsibly and shielding officials from “harassment, distraction, and

21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). These are commonly known as “Section 1983 suits,” after the
statute creating the right. See, e.g., Marjorie J. Dickman, Procedural Means of Enforcement Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 84 GEO. L.J. 1500, 1504 (1996) (referring generally to “section 1983 suit[s]”).
22. Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Discretionary Function, Extraordinary Circumstances,
and Other Nuances, 23 TOURO L. REV. 57, 57 (2007).
23. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
24. 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3573.3 (3d ed. 1998).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (granting qualified immunity to
officers who conducted a warrantless search pursuant to a controversial consent doctrine that had
not yet been ruled upon by their own federal court of appeals).
28. WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 3573.3.
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liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” 29
The Supreme Court first articulated the underpinnings of the modern
doctrine in Harlow v. Fitzgerald: 30 “[G]overnment officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” 31 Since Harlow, the Court has refined this pronouncement
into a two-step test. 32 First, taking the facts in the light most favorable to
the allegedly injured party, courts must determine whether the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right.33 Second, if a violation occurred,
courts ask whether the right was clearly established. 34 Harlow and the
ensuing two-step test raise two questions. First, how clear must the
contours of a right be before it can be considered clearly established? 35
And second, to which sources of law should a court look when
conducting the clearly established analysis? 36
The Court has addressed the first question—the meaning of “clearly
established”—in several cases since Harlow, but a great deal of
ambiguity remains. 37 The first such case was Anderson v. Creighton, 38 in
which Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated,
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful . . . but it is to say
that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
29. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
30. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
31. Id. at 818.
32. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Courts are allowed to exercise discretion in
deciding which of the two steps should be analyzed first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has advised that addressing the two steps in order is often
beneficial. Id. This is especially true in emergent areas of law, as following the order “promotes the
development of constitutional precedent.” Id.
33. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
34. Id.
35. Williams, supra note 14, at 1305.
36. Id. at 1305.
37. See, e.g., Michael S. Catlett, Note, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law and the
Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2005) (noting that “courts routinely
struggle with the determination of the proper level of generality at which the law must be
established”); Williams, supra note 14, at 1304–09 (discussing the post-Harlow line of cases and
the questions that remain).
38. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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apparent. 39
Anderson thus clarified that clearly established law can be defined with
some generality—in other words, the official’s exact conduct need not
have been found unlawful before—but reiterated that the state of the law
at the time of the alleged injury must have been sufficiently clear to put a
reasonable official on notice that his or her conduct violated a
constitutional right. 40 The Court confirmed the notice requirement in
United States v. Lanier, 41 which held that officials are entitled to “fair
warning” that their conduct was unlawful. 42
The Court further refined its stance on notice to officials in Hope v.
Pelzer. 43 In that case, the Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity to
prison officials who handcuffed the plaintiff to a hitching post for seven
hours and denied him water and shelter from the sun because no prior
case addressed the specific conduct at issue. 44 The Supreme Court
reversed, and made clear that “officials can still be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances”:
no case with “fundamentally similar” or “materially similar” facts need
exist to provide the “fair warning” the Court discussed in Lanier. 45 Hope
thus indicated that qualified immunity could be denied when a
government official’s conduct obviously violated a constitutional right,
even in the absence of precedent on point. 46
Next, in Brosseau v. Haugen, 47 the Court set a limit on the ostensibly
broad “fair warning” standard it articulated in Lanier and Hope. 48 In
Brosseau, the Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity to an officer who
shot the plaintiff in the back as he attempted to flee.49 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that using deadly force when the suspect posed no threat of
serious physical harm was a violation of clearly established law.50 The
Supreme Court found this formulation excessively broad and reversed,
emphasizing that the clearly established inquiry “must be undertaken in
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 640.
See id. at 637–38.
520 U.S. 259 (1997).
Id. at 270–71.
536 U.S. 730 (2002).
Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 977, 982 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
543 U.S. 194 (2004).
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997); Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372, 379 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
Id. at 392–93.
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the light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition.” 51 In other words, the Court stated, the contours of the right
cannot be “cast at a high level of generality.” 52
Finally, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 53 the Court continued to backtrack
from the broad “fair warning” standard. 54 In that case, the Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit and unanimously granted qualified immunity to thenAttorney General John Ashcroft, 55 whose policy authorizing federal
agents to use the material-witness statute to detain individuals with
suspected ties to terrorist organizations led to the detention of Abdullah
al-Kidd, a native-born United States citizen who was never called to
testify at trial. 56 The Court concluded that the law cited by the Ninth
Circuit, which relied heavily on a footnote in a Southern District of New
York order, 57 did not clearly establish al-Kidd’s rights at the time of his
detention. 58 The Court called the idea that this footnote would provide
the Attorney General with fair warning that his actions were
unconstitutional “[a]n extraordinary proposition” and declared that the
“footnoted dictum falls far short of what is necessary absent controlling
authority: a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’” 59 The
Court explained that it did “not require a case directly on point, but
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” 60
B.

The Ninth Circuit Purportedly Looks to Any Available Law to
Inform Its Clearly Established Analysis

The second question left open by Harlow is which sources of law may
inform a court’s clearly established analysis. 61 The Supreme Court has
declined to provide lower courts with guidance as to how to determine
whether a particular right was clearly established at the time of an
alleged violation. 62 Circuit courts are therefore left to decide for
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
Id. at 199.
__U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 2085.
Id. at 2079.
United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 77 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).
Id.
Id. at 2083.
Williams, supra note 14, at 1305.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982); Williams, supra note 14, at 1309.
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themselves how to make such a determination and which sources of law
they will use to do so. 63 The Ninth Circuit ostensibly looks to a broad
variety of precedent, beginning with binding precedent from the
Supreme Court and its own body of law. 64 If binding precedent clearly
establishes the right, the inquiry ends. 65 But in the absence of binding
precedent, the Ninth Circuit will purportedly look to “whatever
decisional law is available” to determine whether a right is clearly
established for the purpose of a qualified immunity analysis. 66 Such law
may include “decisions of state courts, other circuits, and district
courts.” 67 Even “unpublished decisions of district courts” may be
considered. 68 The Ninth Circuit compares nonbinding precedent with
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit law to inquire whether, at the time the
nonbinding opinions were rendered, the Ninth Circuit would have
reached the same results. 69
As commentators have noted, this standard is broad—perhaps
unworkably so—and requires law enforcement officials to have an
expansive working knowledge of case law from nearly all courts across
the country. 70 As explained in the Parts that follow, the Ninth Circuit’s
line of Taser cases illustrates that different panels do not always apply
this standard uniformly.

63. See generally Catlett, supra note 37.
64. Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004).
65. Id.
66. Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. Boyd, 374 F.3d at 781.
70. See, e.g., Catlett, supra note 37, at 1048 (“[C]ourts in the Ninth Circuit must examine the
legal analysis of outside courts and compare it to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in related but factually
different situations. Somehow, the Ninth Circuit expects government officials, who normally have
had little or no legal training, to do so as well.”); Jonathan M. Stemerman, Unclearly Establishing
Qualified Immunity: What Sources of Authority May be Used to Determine Whether the Law is
“Clearly Established” In the Third Circuit?, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (2002) (noting the Ninth
Circuit’s “broad approach”); R. George Wright, Qualified and Civic Immunity in Section 1983
Actions: What do Justice and Efficiency Require?, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 19–22 (1998)
(discussing the negative implications of the Ninth Circuit’s broad approach).
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THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAS TAKEN TWO DIFFERENT
APPROACHES TO DETERMINE WHETHER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
IN TASER CASES

The Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence on Taser use and qualified
immunity demonstrates that, in practice, different Ninth Circuit panels
apply different standards when analyzing the clearly established
question. Some look only to binding, factually similar precedent, while
others apply the broader standard discussed in the previous Part. In its
first three seminal cases on Taser use, discussed in turn below, the Ninth
Circuit used the narrower standard to find that the victims’ Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from the use of excessive force were not
clearly established because no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decision
specifically addressing Taser use and excessive force had been
decided. 71 In the most recent Taser-related case, however, the court
changed its approach and used the broader standard to deny qualified
immunity. 72
A.

Early Cases Relied Solely on Binding Taser-Related Precedent

The first Ninth Circuit cases to address Taser use and qualified
immunity were Bryan v. MacPherson, 73 Brooks v. City of Seattle, 74 and
Mattos v. Agarano. 75 In each of these cases, the Ninth Circuit found that
the officers’ Taser use constituted excessive force, but that the officers
were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because no binding,
Taser-related precedent clearly established the right in question. 76
On July 24, 2005, Officer Brian MacPherson stopped a car driven by
the plaintiff, Carl Bryan, because Mr. Bryan was not wearing his
seatbelt. 77 Once outside the car, Mr. Bryan became upset and frustrated,
and he began to yell and hit his own thighs. 78 Mr. Bryan did not direct
71. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (9th
Cir. 2010). Mattos was the consolidation of two cases for rehearing en banc: Brooks v. City of
Seattle, No. C06-1681RAJ, 2008 WL 2433717 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2008) and Mattos v. Agarano,
CV. No. 07-00220 DAE BMK, 2008 WL 465595 (D. Haw. Feb. 21, 2008).
72. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2013).
73. 630 F.3d 805 (2010).
74. 661 F.3d 433 (2011).
75. Id.
76. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 833; Mattos, 661 F.3d at 448, 452.
77. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 822.
78. Id.
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his yelling at Officer MacPherson, and he maintained a distance of
twenty to twenty-five feet from the officer. 79 The physical evidence
suggested that he was facing away from Officer MacPherson when,
without warning, the officer shot Mr. Bryan with his Taser. 80
The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, use of the
Taser on Mr. Bryan constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 81 Yet the court ultimately found that Officer MacPherson
was entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that Mr. Bryan’s
rights were not clearly established at the time of his injury. 82 While
acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence placed Officer MacPherson on fair notice that the use of a
Taser was not justified, the court nevertheless concluded “a reasonable
officer in Officer MacPherson’s position could have made a reasonable
mistake of law regarding the constitutionality of the [T]aser use in the
circumstances.” 83 The court based its determination on the fact that as of
July 2005, there were no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decisions
addressing the use of a Taser in the mode selected by the officer in this
case. 84 The court further noted that “the Taser is a relatively new
implement of force, and case law related to the Taser is developing.” 85
Given the “dearth of prior authority,” the court granted Officer
MacPherson qualified immunity. 86
In Brooks v. City of Seattle, Seattle Police Officer Juan Ornelas
stopped plaintiff Malaika Brooks on November 23, 2004 for speeding in
a school zone. 87 Ms. Brooks was driving twelve miles per hour above
79. Id.
80. Id. The Taser used on Mr. Bryan was set to “dart mode,” in which the device uses compressed
nitrogen to discharge two barbed darts toward the target. The darts, which have a range of fifteen to
thirty-five feet, remain connected to the device by thin, insulated wires. Once the darts contact the
skin (or the target’s clothing within two inches of the skin), an electrical circuit is completed and a
charge is delivered. The charge interrupts the signals from the target’s central nervous system to the
rest of the body, which overloads the motor nervous system and causes rigidity and uncontrollable
muscle spasms. As a result, the target will experience momentary paralysis and fall to the ground.
See generally Greg Meyer, Conducted Electrical Weapons: A User’s Perspective, in TASER
CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS: PHYSIOLOGY, PATHOLOGY AND LAW 1 (Mark W. Kroll &
Jeffery D. Ho eds., 2009); AMNESTY INT’L, ‘LESS THAN LETHAL’?: THE USE OF STUN WEAPONS IN
US LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (2008).
81. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 832.
82. Id. at 833.
83. Id. at 832–33.
84. Id. at 833.
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. Id.
87. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 436 (9th Cir. 2011).
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the posted limit. 88 Following standard procedure, the officer asked
Ms. Brooks to acknowledge receipt of the traffic infraction notice by
signing it. 89 When she refused, Officer Ornelas ordered Ms. Brooks to
get out of her car. 90 Ms. Brooks did not comply, and stiffened her body
and clutched her steering wheel to prevent the officers from prying her
from the car. 91 A second officer, Officer Jones, pulled out his Taser and
showed it to Ms. Brooks. 92 Ms. Brooks informed the officers that she
was pregnant, but still refused to leave the car. 93 Officer Ornelas then
reached into Ms. Brooks’ car and took her key from the ignition.94 After
the keys were removed, Officer Jones tased Ms. Brooks three times
within the span of about one minute. 95
Despite finding that Ms. Brooks’ Fourth Amendment rights were
violated, the Ninth Circuit held that qualified immunity protected the
officers because those rights were not clearly established at the time of
the incident. 96 In so holding, the court relied partially on the fact that as
of November 2004, no federal appellate court had found that Taser use
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. 97 At that time, only three
circuit cases involving Tasers had been decided98 and the court found all
three factually distinguishable. 99 The court then noted that in Bryan, it
had granted qualified immunity on the grounds that no Supreme Court or
Ninth Circuit case addressing the use of a Taser in dart mode had been

88. Id.
89. Id. at 437.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Unlike in Mr. Bryan’s case, the Taser used on Ms. Brooks was set to “drive stun mode.”
Id. In that mode, the officer touches the target directly with the device to deliver the shock. In
contrast to dart mode, a Taser applied in drive-stun mode incapacitates only the area of the body to
which the Taser is applied. It causes significant pain but does not affect the target’s neuromuscular
system. Tasers in drive-stun mode are therefore used primarily as a “pain compliance” tool. Meyer,
supra note 80, at 2. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 80, at 6.
96. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 446.
97. Id. at 448.
98. Those cases were Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Taser use
was appropriate where the plaintiff behaved in a confrontational and agitated manner); Hinton v.
City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where
officers used a Taser on an escapee from a psychiatric institute who threatened to kill the officers
and brandished knives at them); and Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992)
(approving Taser use where the plaintiff shoved, kicked, and bit law enforcement officers).
99. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 448.
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decided prior to the injury in question. 100 The Mattos court granted
qualified immunity because the relevant law was not sufficiently clearly
established at the time of the injury, leaving unclear whether it had based
its decision on the inapplicability of the other circuits’ precedent or on
the lack of available precedent from the Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit. 101
In Mattos v. Agarano, plaintiff Jayzel Mattos called the police after a
domestic dispute with her husband Troy on August 23, 2006. 102 When
the officers arrived and saw Mr. Mattos sitting outside, they asked if
they could speak with Ms. Mattos. 103 Mr. Mattos went inside the house
to get his wife, and the officers followed him in. 104 Because Mr. Mattos
did not want the officers in his home, Ms. Mattos agreed to talk to with
them outside. 105 Before she could leave, another officer entered the
home and announced that Mr. Mattos was under arrest. 106 Ms. Mattos,
who was standing in front of her husband, did not immediately move out
of the way. 107 As the officer moved closer to complete the arrest, Ms.
Mattos extended her arm to prevent the officer’s body from pushing
against her chest. 108 She asked why her husband was being arrested and
asked everyone to calm down and go outside to prevent disturbing her
sleeping children. 109 The officer became upset that Ms. Mattos had
touched him and tased her without warning. 110
As in Bryan and Brooks, the court found that the officer’s conduct
violated Ms. Mattos’ Fourth Amendment rights. 111 But, for the same
reasons cited in Brooks, the court once again found that the officer was
shielded by qualified immunity: the alleged constitutional violation was
not clearly established at the time the conduct occurred because there
was no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit opinion addressing the use of a
Taser in the mode selected by the officer in this case. 112
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id. at 438–39.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Taser applied to Ms. Mattos was set to dart mode. Id.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 452.
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Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton Took a Divergent Approach to the
“Clearly Established” Question

In the next Taser case, just two years after Mattos, the Ninth Circuit
reversed course and held that the defendant officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity. 113 In contrast with the earlier cases, the court cited
broad, general legal principles from non-Taser cases, other circuits, and
district courts in conducting its clearly established inquiry. 114 In
Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 115 Washington police officers responded to
a 911 call placed on May 4, 2008 by the family of a man, Jack Hawes,
who was attempting to commit suicide in his car. 116 The officers
successfully convinced Mr. Hawes to get out of the car, but when
Mr. Hawes refused multiple instructions to show his hands, one of the
officers tased him. 117 Mr. Hawes fell to the ground but continued to
resist as the officers attempted to restrain him. 118 At some point during
the struggle, the Hawes’ neighbor, Jack Gravelet-Blondin, came out of
his house to see what was happening. 119 Mr. Blondin called out, “What
are you doing to Jack?” 120 The officers ordered Mr. Blondin to get back,
but he “froze” and did not respond to their commands. 121 The officers
then tased Mr. Blondin as well. 122
The district court found that the officer’s use of force was excessive
under the Fourth Amendment. 123 Still, the court held that the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity because as of the date of the injury,
no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decision had been issued addressing
the use of Tasers in the mode selected by the officer in this case.124 The
court specifically noted that the Mattos court found no binding decision
would have placed officers in that case on notice that their conduct was
unconstitutional, and no such decision had been issued between the

113. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2013).
114. Id. at 1092–96.
115. 728 F.3d 1086.
116. Id. at 1089.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1090.
121. Id.
122. Id. The taser used on Mr. Blondin was also set to dart mode. Id.
123. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, No. C09-1487RSL, 2012 WL 395428, at *5–6 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 6, 2012).
124. Id. at *7.

15 - Seabright Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 11:02 AM

504

[Vol. 89:491

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

events in Mattos and those in Gravelet-Blondin. 125
A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court. The panel
agreed that Mr. Blondin’s constitutional rights were violated, but
disagreed with the district court’s determination that neither the officers
nor the city could be held liable for it. 126 Ultimately, the court found that
“[t]he right to be free from the application of non-trivial force for
engaging in mere passive resistance” was clearly established before May
2008. 127 In support of this assertion, the court cited two cases. The first
was Deorle v. Rutherford, 128 in which the Ninth Circuit denied qualified
immunity to an officer who, without warning, shot a beanbag projectile
at the emotionally disturbed plaintiff, who was walking directly toward
the officer. 129 The second was Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of
Humboldt, 130 in which the Ninth Circuit held that the law regarding a
police officer’s use of pepper spray to subdue, remove, or arrest
nonviolent protestors was sufficiently clear to put the officer on notice
that his use of force was excessive. 131
The court acknowledged that those cases did not concern Tasers, but
stated that such a connection was unnecessary. 132 It noted the “wellestablished” rule that
it does not matter that no case . . . directly addresses the use of [a
particular weapon]; we have held that “[a]n officer is not entitled
to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law is not clearly
established every time a novel method is used to inflict
injury.” 133
The court also noted that as of 2008, three other circuits had held that
using a Taser might in some instances constitute excessive force.134
125. Id.
126. Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1090.
127. Id. at 1093.
128. 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001).
129. Id. at 1276–78, 1282.
130. 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 1131.
132. Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1093.
133. Id. (quoting Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1286).
134. Id. Those cases were Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding it
was clearly established as of 2008 that tasing an unarmed individual suspected of a misdemeanor
who did not resist arrest, threaten an officer, or attempt to run, and who did not behave aggressively
constituted excessive force); Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, 625 F.3d 661 (10th Cir. 2010)
(holding it was clearly established as of 2006 that police officers could not, without warning, tase “a
nonviolent misdemeanant who did not pose a threat” or resist or evade arrest); Brown v. City of
Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding it was clearly established as of 2005 that
tasing an individual who posed a minimal safety threat and who was not resisting arrest or
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The majority’s formulation of the issue in this case may be broken
down into two components: whether Mr. Blondin engaged in “mere
passive resistance,” and whether a Taser in dart mode constitutes “non
trivial force.” 135 The court answered both of these questions in the
affirmative. As to the first issue, the court determined that Mr. Blondin
had no connection to the underlying crime, took no affirmative steps to
violate an officer’s order, did not physically resist or make physical
contact with officers, and did not attempt to interfere with efforts to
arrest a suspect. 136 The court concluded that his failure to move farther
than thirty-seven feet away from the officers after inquiring as to what
they were doing could not be considered resistance. 137 As to the second
issue, the court cited a variety of opinions from other circuits and district
courts to determine that the use of a Taser in dart mode did constitute
“non-trivial force.” 138 The court tracked the progression of other courts’
statements regarding Tasers’ level of force and circumstances under
which their use is constitutional, beginning with its own 2005
pronouncement that Tasers are a “variety of non-lethal ‘pain
compliance’ weapons.” 139 It then considered Tenth Circuit and district
court cases finding that Taser use was unconstitutional in some
instances, 140 cases finding that Taser use may be justified when the
suspect is actively resisting arrest, 141 and finally district court orders
finding that Tasers constitute “excessive force” and disapproving of their
use on arrestees who “passively comply” with an officer’s orders.142 The
court used these cases to support its determination that, as of 2008, it
was well known “that a [T]aser in dart mode constitutes more than trivial
attempting to flee violated the Fourth Amendment); and Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.
2009) (holding it was clearly established as of 2004 that it was excessive to repeatedly tase an
individual who engaged in a physical struggle with an officer, because the individual became
immobilized after the first tasing).
135. Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1093, 1094–95.
136. Id. at 1094. Note, however, the difference between the Ninth Circuit’s version of events and
that offered by the District Court. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, No. C09-1487RSL, 2012 WL
395428, at *1–3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2012) (noting that Blondin’s presence distracted the officers
in a “very dangerous, fluid situation” and that he contributed to the “volatile” nature of the scene).
137. Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1094.
138. Id. at 1094–96.
139. Id. at 1095 (citing San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose,
204 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2005)).
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007); Hinton v. City of
Elwood, 997 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1993); Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004)).
142. Id. at 1095–96 (citing Beaver v. City of Fed. Way, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (W.D. Wash.
2007); Harris v. Cnty. of King, C05-1121C, 2006 WL 2711769 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2006)).
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force.” 143 In sum, the court departed from the precedent it set in Bryan,
Brooks, and Mattos of looking strictly to Taser cases from the Ninth
Circuit and the Supreme Court, and began looking to both Taser and
non-Taser related cases from other circuits and from district courts. 144
III. THE LACK OF CONSISTENCY IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED ANALYSIS RESULTS IN THREE
MAJOR PROBLEMS
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, the Ninth Circuit has taken
two different approaches to the clearly established analysis, despite its
insistence that it will look to “whatever decisional law is available.”145
Some panels, including the Bryan and Mattos panels, look to binding,
factually similar precedent.146 For ease of reference, this Comment refers
to this as the “Bryan approach.” Others, including the Gravelet-Blondin
majority, apply the broad “all available decisional law” rule, 147 which
this Comment refers to as the “Gravelet-Blondin approach.” The Taser
cases help illustrate three major problems this variance creates. First, it
results in inconsistent outcomes for litigants. Second, it creates
confusion for district courts and government officials. Finally, it does
nothing to help the Ninth Circuit’s propensity for defining clearly
established law at an impermissibly high level of generality.
A.

Under the Current Approach, Litigants Are Subject to Inconsistent
Outcomes

Perhaps most troubling, the current approach can lead to inconsistent
results for litigants. A plaintiff whose case is subjected to the stricter
Bryan approach has a lesser chance of being able to pursue relief than a
plaintiff whose case is subjected to the broader Gravelet-Blondin
approach. The Taser cases again provide an illustrative example.
Arguably, the plaintiff in Mattos could have proceeded with her Section
1983 suit had the Mattos court applied the Gravelet-Blondin approach.
As explained in Part II.B, the Gravelet-Blondin court broke the qualified
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1105 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
145. Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003).
146. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 833 (9th Cir. 2010); Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433,
452 (9th Cir. 2011). The Mattos court looked at three cases from other circuit courts of appeal, but
also relied on the statement in Bryan that no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit case had touched on
this issue. Furthermore, Mattos did not mention or examine district court cases.
147. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013).
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immunity issue into two questions: Was the right to be free from the
application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere passive resistance
clearly established prior to the date of the injury? 148 And was it clear by
that date that using a Taser was non-trivial? 149
The Gravelet-Blondin court answered both of those questions in the
affirmative, 150 and—based on the law at the time of the offense—the
Mattos court could have as well. All of the cases cited in the GraveletBlondin court’s discussion of the first question were published before the
events in Mattos. 151 If the Mattos court had approached the clearly
established question in the same way that the Gravelet-Blondin court
did, it could also have found that the right to be free from the application
of non-trivial force for engaging in passive resistance was established
prior to the injury in that case.
As to the second part of the inquiry, most of the cases the GraveletBlondin court cited to find that Tasers constituted non-trivial use 152 were
published after the events in Mattos, which occurred in August of
2006. 153 However, a district court had noted by 2004 in Marsall v. City
of Portland 154 that “less-lethal” weapons can constitute “substantial
force,” 155 and the Ninth Circuit had recognized by 2005 that Tasers were
“non-lethal” weapons. 156 Therefore, the Mattos court could also have
answered the second question in the affirmative and denied qualified
immunity under the Gravelet-Blondin approach.

148. The court distinguished Bryan and Mattos on the grounds that in each of those cases, the
plaintiff “either took an affirmative step to contravene officer orders or engaged in behavior that
posed some threat to officer safety.” Id. at 1094. But this is not a foregone conclusion. Arguably,
Jayzel Mattos did not engage in anything more than “mere passive resistance” when she blocked the
officer attempting to arrest her husband. She did not intentionally interfere with the officer’s access
to her husband; she was simply standing in front of him at the time the officer announced the arrest
and put out her arm to prevent the officer from pushing against her chest. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 439.
Therefore, it was possible for the Mattos court to formulate the qualified immunity question in
exactly the same way the Gravelet-Blondin court did.
149. Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1092–96.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1093–94.
152. San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962 (9th
Cir. 2005); Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007); Beaver v. City of Fed.
Way, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Harris v. Cnty. of King, No. C05-1121C, 2006 WL
2711769 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2006).
153. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 438.
154. No. CV-01-1014-ST, 2004 WL 1048127 (D. Or. May 7, 2004).
155. Id. at *9.
156. San Jose Charter of Hells Angels, 402 F.3d at 969. The Gravelet-Blondin majority cited this
case for the same proposition. 728 F.3d at 1095.
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District Courts and Government Officials Are Left Without
Meaningful Guidance

The current inconsistent approach creates confusion for both district
courts and government officials, which interferes with their ability to
perform their respective functions efficiently. District courts are left to
guess whether they should take the Bryan or the Gravelet-Blondin
approach, and depending upon the panel hearing the case on appeal, they
risk being reversed for guessing incorrectly. The Ninth Circuit spends
time and resources writing published opinions for these reversals.
Gravelet-Blondin’s own history provides an example. The district court
in that case chose to apply the Bryan approach, 157 but the district judge
had no way of knowing whether the appellate panel would agree or
whether it would apply the Gravelet-Blondin approach, as it ended up
choosing to do. 158 Litigants are also impacted: the current inconsistent
approach creates an incentive to appeal, as there is always a chance that
the Ninth Circuit will apply the standard rejected by the district court.
The inconsistency thus may lead to a greater number of cases being
appealed, increasing costs for both parties involved.
The varying approaches taken by both the Ninth Circuit and district
courts in turn create confusion and uncertainty for government officials.
As has been pointed out, it is unrealistic to expect government officials
to keep track of all the opinions published (or not published) across the
country and adjust their behavior accordingly. 159 Qualified immunity is
meant to shield officials from liability where the law gives no “fair
warning” that a particular action violates a constitutional right.160 That
purpose is not achieved when officers cannot be sure what the rules are
or how a court will evaluate their conduct.

157. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, No. C09-1487RSL, 2012 WL 395428, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
6, 2012).
158. See id. Simply overruling Gravelet-Blondin will not solve the problem. As long as the Ninth
Circuit’s pronouncement that in “the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to whatever
decisional law is available to ascertain whether the law is clearly established for qualified immunity
purposes” remains good law, the problem identified in this Comment remains an issue. See
Drummond ex. rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotations omitted).
159. Catlett, supra note 37, at 1048.
160. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
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The Current Approach Leads to Overly-Broad Definitions of
Clearly Established Law

The final issue created by the uncertainty of the Ninth Circuit’s
approach is that it can sometimes lead to impermissibly broad definitions
of clearly established law. In its most recent cases on qualified
immunity, the Supreme Court has made clear that the clearly established
analysis cannot be undertaken at a high level of generality, 161 and the
Ninth Circuit has been criticized for disregarding this rule in the past. 162
The loose rules currently employed in the Ninth Circuit do nothing to
keep courts in this circuit in line with the Supreme Court’s mandate. To
take another example from the Taser cases, the dissent in GraveletBlondin argued that the majority’s formulation of the issue in that case
(whether the right to be free from non-trivial force for engaging in mere
passive resistance was clearly established prior to the date of the injury)
was inappropriate in light of the Supreme Court’s instruction that the
qualified immunity inquiry must be undertaken “in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” 163
The dissent has a point. The majority lifted general principles from
the cases it relied upon without regard for the factual context that
produced them. For example, the majority relied on Headwaters Forest
Defense v. County of Humboldt 164 to support its assertion that “[t]he
right to be free from the application of non-trivial force for engaging in
mere passive resistance” was clearly established at the time of the injury
in Gravelet-Blondin. 165 Humboldt involved a series of protests in which
officers sprayed nonviolent protestors’ faces with pepper spray from
inches away and used Q-tips to apply pepper spray directly to the
protestors’ eyes. 166 The Humboldt court found that the protestors’ rights
were clearly established, but plainly tied its decision to the specific facts
of that case:
Because the officers had control over the protestors it would
have been clear to any reasonable officer that it was unnecessary

161. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
162. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (reversing the Ninth
Circuit) (warning “the Ninth Circuit in particular” to avoid “defin[ing] clearly established law at a
high level of generality”); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (same); Katz, 533 U.S. at
200 (same); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227–29 (1991) (same).
163. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
164. 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002).
165. 728 F.3d at 1093.
166. Humboldt, 276 F.3d at 1128–29.
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to use pepper spray to bring them under control, and even less
necessary to repeatedly use pepper spray against the protestors
when they refused to [comply with orders] . . . . It also would
have been clear to any reasonable officer that the manner in
which the officers used the pepper spray was
unreasonable . . . . [T]he manufacturer’s label on the canisters of
pepper spray defendants used expressly discouraged spraying
pepper spray from distances of less than three feet. 167
In short, the Humboldt holding was predicated upon the very specific
facts of that case. The Gravelet-Blondin majority made no attempt to
compare those facts to the circumstances of the case before it; the panel
simply took a broad paraphrase of the Humboldt holding, stripped it of
factual references, and applied that statement to its own, factually
distinct situation. 168 In doing so, the majority failed to ground its
analysis in the specific context of the case.
Additionally, the rule articulated by the Gravelet-Blondin majority
likely runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s admonition not to cast the
contours of constitutional rights “at a high level of generality.” 169 In
Gravelet-Blondin, the court announced a clearly established right to be
free from the application of non-trivial force for engaging in passive
resistance. 170 The Ninth Circuit has been criticized in the past for relying
on statements of a similar breadth. In Brosseau v. Haugen, 171 for
example, the Supreme Court admonished the Ninth Circuit for finding a
clearly established right based on the general statement that “deadly
force is only permissible where the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm.” 172 This
statement is no less general than the one relied upon by the GraveletBlondin majority: “deadly force” is just as broad as “non-trivial force,”
while “pos[ing] a threat of serious harm” is equally general as “passive
resistance.” The lack of consistency in the Ninth Circuit’s approach to
the clearly established question gives courts substantial leeway in their
analysis, which makes it all too easy to give in to the temptation to
define clearly established law at a high level of generality.

167. Id. at 1130 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
168. See Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1093.
169. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
170. Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1094.
171. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
172. Id. at 198; Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372, 392–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations
omitted).
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD ADOPT A CLEARLYDEFINED THREE-STEP PROCEDURE FOR THE CLEARY
ESTABLISHED ANALYSIS
As this Comment illustrates, the Ninth Circuit’s different approaches
to deciding what constitutes clearly established law create several
serious problems. This Part argues that adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach to the clearly established analysis will go a long way in
addressing the problems created by the Ninth Circuit’s current approach.
The Ninth Circuit’s line of cases regarding Taser use demonstrates how
the approaches differ and why the Eleventh Circuit’s approach will help
mitigate the problems discussed above.
The Eleventh Circuit has created a clear and concise framework for
conducting the clearly established analysis by identifying three ways in
which government officials may be put on notice that their conduct is
unconstitutional. 173 First, the language of a federal statute or
constitutional provision may be “specific enough to establish clearly the
law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances to overcome
qualified immunity, even in the total absence of case law.” 174 In other
words, the plain language of a statute or constitutional provision may be
“so clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not needed to establish
that the conduct cannot be lawful.” 175 The Eleventh Circuit calls such
situations ones of “obvious clarity.” 176
Second, if the official’s conduct “is not so egregious as to violate [the
law] on its face,” the Eleventh Circuit turns to broad statements of
principle in case law. 177 Such statements are not tied to particularized
facts and can be applied to different sets of facts to answer the clearly

173. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2002).
174. Id. at 1350 (emphasis omitted).
175. Id.
176. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has found situations of “obvious clarity” in the Fourth Amendment
context where, for example, an officer released a police dog to attack the plaintiff who was lying on
the ground, did not pose a threat to anyone at the scene, and was not attempting to flee or resist
arrest, Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000), or where an officer,
while on the plaintiff’s back attempting to handcuff him, broke the plaintiff’s arm requiring surgery
for multiple fractures even though the plaintiff offered no resistance at all, Smith v. Mattox, 127
F.3d 1416, 1419–20 (11th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit has expressed the opinion that Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd called into question the concept of “obvious cases” as established in Hope v. Pelzer. See
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 373 (5th Cir. 2011). However, several circuits continue to apply
the “obvious case” rule even after Ashcroft. For a detailed argument against the Fifth Circuit’s
position, see Amelia A. Friedman, Qualified Immunity in the Fifth Circuit: Identifying the
“Obvious” Hold in Clearly Established Law, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1300–04 (2012).
177. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351.
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established question. 178 These statements can only be created if the
earlier court decided the case “by determining that ‘X Conduct’ is
unconstitutional without tying that determination to a particularized set
of facts.” 179 The Eleventh Circuit notes that there is a presumption
against wide principles of law, and if a broad principle is sufficient to
establish clearly established law, it must do so with “obvious clarity”
such that every reasonable government official in the same
circumstances would know that his or her conduct violated the law. 180
Third, if no broad pronouncement of law may be applied to the
situation, the Eleventh Circuit looks at “precedent that is tied to the
facts.” 181 It looks to cases “in which the Supreme Court or [the Eleventh
Circuit] or the pertinent state supreme court has said that ‘Y Conduct’ is
unconstitutional in ‘Z Circumstances.’” 182 When fact-specific precedent
establishes the law, a case that is “fairly distinguishable” from the
circumstances in the case before the court cannot clearly establish the
law and qualified immunity must be granted. 183 Where, on the other
hand, the circumstances of the instant case are “materially similar, the
precedent can clearly establish the applicable law.” 184 This Part suggests
that the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation would significantly mitigate the
problems created by the Ninth Circuit’s current approach.
The first issue that adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s approach would
help to address is inconsistent outcomes for litigants. The Eleventh
Circuit’s standard is both structured and detailed—two qualities the
Ninth Circuit’s divergent approach lacks. The Eleventh Circuit’s
approach requires that courts proceed through the three steps in order,
for example, and it provides strict guidance on the types of cases that
may provide support for the clearly established analysis. If all Ninth
Circuit courts faithfully followed the Eleventh Circuit’s three-step
process, there would be less room for disagreement between courts, and
litigants could feel more confident that their cases would be decided
consistently regardless of the district court or appellate panel to which
they were assigned.
Likewise, district courts and government officials could feel more
confident about the law and how to apply it. Refining the clearly
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1352.
Id.
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established analysis would help government officials understand where
the line between acceptable and unacceptable conduct lies, and where
they should look to find that line. The Eleventh Circuit’s approach
removes a good deal of the existing uncertainty by limiting the body of
law used in its analysis, requiring only that officers be aware of the
court’s binding decisions. 185 It also limits the complexity of the legal
analysis an officer must conduct before taking action. In GraveletBlondin, the Ninth Circuit performed legal acrobatics to arrive at its
decision. 186 Under the Eleventh Circuit standard, only “materially
similar” precedent that is “tied to the facts” of the situation faced by the
officer would be relevant. 187
Finally, faithful adherence to the three-step process would help Ninth
Circuit courts avoid defining clearly established law at an impermissibly
high level of generality. However, step two in particular must be applied
with caution: courts must be careful to draw broad statements of
principle only when the court that originally made the statement did not
tie that principle to the specific facts of that case, as the standard
requires. 188 For example, the assertion in Gravelet-Blondin regarding the
right to be free from non-trivial force for engaging in mere passive
resistance would not have passed muster under the Eleventh Circuit
standard, as the cases cited for that proposition tied it directly to the facts
of those cases. 189 Being mindful of the limitations in step two of the
process, and bearing in mind the Eleventh Circuit’s warning that there is
a presumption against wide principles of judge-made law, 190 would help
the Ninth Circuit keep its future decisions in line with the Supreme
Court’s instructions. Step three of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis, in
which courts look to binding precedent that is specifically tied to the
facts, will also remind courts to be cognizant of the specific factual

185. Id. at 1351 (noting that the Eleventh Circuit looks only to Supreme Court cases and cases
from its own circuit).
186. See supra Part II.B.
187. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351–52. The purpose of this Comment is not to make it more difficult
for plaintiffs to proceed with their Section 1983 suits. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit standard is no
stricter than the Bryan approach. For example, it is entirely possible that under the Eleventh Circuit
standard, Ms. Brooks would have been able to go forward with her case. Arguably, all relevant
factors weighed strongly in favor of finding a Fourth Amendment violation. Under the Eleventh
Circuit standard, Ms. Brooks’ case could very well fall under the first category of “obvious cases”
and qualified immunity would be denied. The “obvious cases” category is an important tool for all
Section 1983 plaintiffs. For more on this category and its utility, see Friedman, supra note 176.
188. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351.
189. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013).
190. Id.
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context of the cases before them. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit
should take an appropriate case en banc to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s
standard.
CONCLUSION
Significant uncertainty still exists regarding the clearly established
inquiry and the sources of law to which a court should look when
conducting the clearly established analysis. The Ninth Circuit purports to
look to “any available decisional law,” but in practice sometimes follows
a much narrower standard, looking only to factually similar cases from
the Supreme Court and its own jurisdiction.
This Comment highlights the inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit’s
approach and identifies the issues that may result: inconsistent results for
litigants, confusion for district courts and government officials, and
inappropriately broad pronouncements of clearly established law. The
Ninth Circuit should take an appropriate case en banc to adopt the
Eleventh Circuit’s three-part inquiry, which would help to ensure fair
and consistent outcomes, provide clarity to district courts and
government officials, and help the Ninth Circuit avoid defining clearly
established law at an impermissibly high level of generality.

